Hukm : the creolization of authority in Condominium Sudan. by Willis,  J.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
23 May 2008
Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Willis, J. (2005) ’Hukm : the creolization of authority in Condominium Sudan.’, Journal of African history.,
46 (1). pp. 29-50.
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S002185370400996X
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Cambridge University Press 2005
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Hukm : THE CREOL IZAT ION OF AUTHORITY IN
CONDOMIN IUM SUDAN*
BY JUSTIN WILLIS
Durham University
ABSTRACT: Recent scholarship on ‘neo-traditionalism’ and colonial governance
in Africa has challenged assumptions about the ‘invention of tradition’ and the
ability of the colonial state to create wholly innovative kinds of local authority.
This article explores one episode in the development of the authority of Ali el
Tom, probably the most famous ‘traditional ’ ruler in Condominium Sudan. It
suggests that Ali el Tom’s authority was a creole product, which drew on local
moral codes and colonial forms of authority, but was not fully part of either. The
willingness of his people to accept this sometimes abusive authority relied on a
partly illusory sense that it was familiar; but this willingness was not unlimited,
and on occasion actions from below set limits to the invention of authority and
tradition.
KEY WORDS: Sudan, colonial administration, chieftaincy, courts, governance.
I have seen a few cases here of gross misuse of the old hukms which would never
have been tolerated if the nas had understood what was happening1
SLIPPING the occasional word of the language of their subjects into their
speech was a common enough aﬀectation amongst colonial oﬃcials. Whether
or not the speaker actually possessed any ﬂuency in the language they
appropriated, this was a device which simultaneously asserted conﬁdent
mastery of an exotic people and claimed membership of an elite group of men
who knew the language and the country; the command of language was, as
Dianna Jeater has noted, an ‘esoteric skill ’.2 Yet these linguistic cross-overs
have further signiﬁcance, if we consider the nature of the colonial adminis-
trator’s task as one of turning policy devised in one language into a practice of
rule which was spoken in another – or, as the author of the example above
rather more carefully put it, ‘ interpreting to [the tribes] policy and instruc-
tions’.3 The terms from this interpretation which blow back into the
* I should like to thank the anonymous referees of the Journal, and the members of the
seminar group at the Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum and
the African Studies seminar of the University of Oxford, all of whom endured earlier
versions of this paper. I should also like to express my thanks to the staﬀ of the Sudan
Archive at Durham and the National Records Oﬃce, Khartoum. Research for this paper
was made possible by an AHRB project grant.
1 Hamilton to MacMichael, 8 Mar. 1928, National Record Oﬃce, Khartoum (NRO)
1CIVSEC 1/33/89.
2 D. Jeater, ‘Speaking like a native: vernacular languages and the state in Southern
Rhodesia, 1890–1935’, Journal of African History, 42 (2001), 449–68.
3 Hamilton, ‘Devolution’, attached with Civil Secretary (CS) to all governors, 7 Apr.
1931, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/35/94. Jeater also notes the complexity of the task of
‘ interpretation’; ‘Speaking like a native’, 458.
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language of the ruler from the language of the ruled surely tell us something
both of the language and practice of rule: for they suggest that these were not
simply translations, manifesting an equivalence of meaning – but rather were
new phenomena. The untranslatability of certain terms hints at the existence
of a space which lies between the worlds of colonizer and colonized – to what
some would call hybridization.4 But the evocation of Homi Bhabha may be
problematic – partly because hybridization (with its implications of the
genetic mixing of two clearly distinct strains) seems a curiously inappropriate
term for cultural processes, but also because Bhabha’s focus on mimicry and
the ‘mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power’ misstates the am-
bitions and fears of both colonizers and colonized. The emergence of a lan-
guage and practice of rule might more usefully be seen as a creolization – not
in Benedict Anderson’s limited deﬁnition of the emergence of a colonial
culture of purely European extraction, but rather with the full linguistic
implications of that term – the emergence of something new, through cul-
tural processes, which was more than simply a blend of its constituent parts.5
In Condominium Sudan, hukm and naswere terms in a system of governance
which lay between and beyond the moral and linguistic worlds of colonizer
and colonized.Hukm connoted a complex bundle of judicial practices associ-
ated with ‘native administration’; at its most basic, it meant the ability
to punish through a government-recognized court. Nas referred to those
without authority of any sort – the ‘subjects’, in the full sense in which
Mahmood Mamdani uses the word.6
This paper concerns the hukm of one of the most famous ‘native auth-
orities’ of the Sudan: Ali el Tom, the nazir – the government recognized
paramount – of the Kababish, whose status as the beau ide´al of British
imaginings of traditional nomad Arab rule has been widely noted by aca-
demics.7 It explores one particularly revealing example of the exercise of his
hukm, and in so doing recurs to a familiar theme of African history in this
period – the central importance of judicial innovation in changing the nature
4 H. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London, 1994), particularly 112–22.
5 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reﬂections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London, 1991), 47, gives the narrow deﬁnition of ‘Creole ’. The sense in
which the term is used in this paper accords rather more with Anderson’s use of the term
inlander and his discussion of language change in Indonesia : see 122 and 132–3.
6 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism (Princeton, 1996). Hukm is derived from a root with multiple forms and
implications across the Arabic-speaking world; it relates to spheres of order, control,
medicine and justice. This paper will argue that in Condominium practice, pulled from
Arabic not-quite-into English, this particular word had a simpler register, describing the
act or power of punishing through a government-recognized court. Nas ( ) is a word
used more widely in Arabic to mean ‘people’, but in the Condominium it was used as the
plural form of zol, a word used for ordinary rural Sudanese, whose derivation from the
root apparently hints at loss and separation. S. Hillelson, Sudan Arabic: English-
Arabic Vocabulary (London, 1930); H. Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic
(Wiesbaden, 1961). Interestingly, a Condominium guide to polite usage clearly diﬀer-
entiated between nas – used to describe the subjects of a headman – and ahl, translated as
‘folk’, implying people of some signiﬁcance: V. Griﬃth and A. R. Ali Taha, Sudan
Courtesy Customs (Khartoum, 1936), 7 and 82.
7 M.W. Daly, ‘Introduction’, in C. A. E. Lea, On Trek in Kordofan: The Diaries of a
British District Oﬃcer in the Sudan, ed. M. W. Daly (London, 1994), 7.
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of the authority wielded by African subordinates of the colonial state. Across
the continent the law was, as Martin Chanock has put it, ‘ the cutting edge
of colonialism’. In British territories ‘customary law’ was central to the
attempts to ‘regularize’ or ‘strengthen’ or ‘revive’ – the terminology varied,
though the implication did not – the allegedly traditional powers of those on
whose assistance they relied.8 Yet the familiarity of the theme should not
obscure the diversity of historical experience: some courts produced mul-
tiple appeals to higher authority, others did not; some were ﬂooded with
‘cases’, and others were not. As Richard Roberts and Kristin Mann have
shown (and as Brett Shadle has recently reminded us), courts were not
always arenas for the unquestioned exercise of colonial and patriarchal
power.9 One might say, crudely, that some of these experiments in ‘tra-
ditional ’ justice did what administrators hoped they might do – maintain
order with minimal supervision, and without generating substantial re-
sistance – and others did not. The example discussed here is of a court which
usually did what administrators hoped, but on one occasion did not; this one
aberration suggests how judicial innovation could work so eﬀectively, and
how it could create a novel governance – a creole governance, born of local
circumstance and speaking its own, novel language, in which the bounds of
propriety were uncertain.
ABBADI ALI AND HIS WIFE KHADIJA
In March 1936, Ali Salim Bilal went on a tax-collecting mission at Marakh,
in the northern part of Sudan’s Kordofan Province. Ali Salim’s only formal
position was as a member of the native administration court which operated
under the authority of the recognized nazir, or ruler, of the Kababish tribe.
But Ali Salim was the son of Salim Bilal, the president of the local subordi-
nate court, and he was also the nephew of Salim Bilal’s brother, Ali el
Tom – the nazir of the Kababish, to whom Salim Bilal’s court was subordi-
nate, and the eﬀective ruler of the whole vast swathe of northern Kordofan,
some 50,000 square miles in all, which formed a sub-district of its own and
was routinely known as Dar Kababish – the land of the Kababish.10
The use of relatives in administration was a central element of Ali el Tom’s
rule. He relied heavily on members of his Nurab section, and particularly the
Awlad Fadlallah lineage, who monopolized membership of the main court
of Dar Kababish. This clan rule was bolstered by the employment of
various other agents, who were not related to Ali el Tom but were his per-
sonal clients, raised from poverty and obscurity in his service. British oﬃcials
accepted, and even encouraged, the use of this retinue of family and clients
for ‘routine work’ ; one approvingly quoted a nicely ambiguous comment
on the attitude of Ali el Tom’s brother, Muhammad, to his constant
8 M. Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order (Portsmouth NH, 1998 [1st edn
Cambridge, 1985]), 4.
9 R. Roberts and K. Mann, ‘Law in colonial Africa’, in K. Mann and R. Roberts, Law
in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth NH, 1991), 3–48, at 22–3, 32; B. Shadle, ‘Bridewealth and
female consent: marriage disputes in African courts, Gusiiland, Kenya’, Journal of
African History, 44 (2003), 241–62.
10 A useful eye-witness account of Dar Kababish is oﬀered in P. Hogg, ‘Memoir of
Soderi ’, Sudan Archive Durham (SAD) 815/11/7-32.
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employment: ‘Fi shughli el hakuma, ma ﬁ taab ’ (‘There’s no tiredness/
diﬃculty in doing the work of the government’).11
Ali Salim’s visit, then, was routine. An extra-legal routine, as it happened,
for he would have followed established practice in extracting from the people
considerably more than the tax which was formally due, or was recorded.
The handful of European administrators with intimate knowledge of Dar
Kababish all knew that its people paid an additional tax, of grain from cul-
tivators and livestock from pastoralists, which was used by Ali el Tom to
build up his own wealth, to reward his followers and to bestow largesse upon
the many people who sought personal assistance from him.12 But (with one
brief and soon-abandoned exception) no administrator had ever tried to
prevent this – and they had suppressed the ﬁndings of zealous Sudanese
subordinates who had collected information on such malpractice.13
But on this occasion Ali Salim went away with more than some additional
tax. His eye was caught by a beautiful woman. Accounts of what happened
next diﬀered markedly. Ali Salim was to argue, later on, that he had enquired
as to whether the woman was available for marriage, and had been told that
she was; he had therefore hastened to pay the requested brideprice and had
summoned a feki, a medical practitioner-cum-Islamic scholar, to witness the
marriage. Khadija, the woman herself, told a diﬀerent story; she insisted that
she had made it very clear that she was already married, but that Ali Salim
had bullied or bribed her family into saying, untruthfully, that she had been
divorced by her ﬁrst husband, and into accepting the bride price of £E10 and
eleven cloths:
There came to meHamid Ali andMohamed Ahmed el Neam who is my [maternal]
uncle, khal, and told me that Ali Salim wished to marry me. I told them that I am
already the wife of Abbadi Ali, but they said this man is an inﬂuential man and we
cannot refuse his request.14
It seems curious that Ali Salim’s suspicions were not aroused when his
bride ﬂed, but he claimed that he was quite unaware of her protests, and of
any question over her status; although, according to one account, when
Khadija’s mother publicly insisted that her daughter was married ‘she was
beaten with whips and insulted’.15 Khadija’s actual husband, Abbadi Ali,
was in Omdurman on business; learning of his wife’s remarriage when he
found Ali Salim in his home on his return, he set oﬀ at once for the camp
of the Kababish nazir to protest. Again, accounts of what happened next
11 Kordofan Province Monthly Diary, June 1938, NRO 1CIVSEC 57/8/32; ‘The
regularisation of the Kababish tribal administration’, attached to Charles de Bunsen,
Assistant District Commissioner (ADC) Soderi to Governor Kordofan, 1 Jan. 1934,
NRO 1CIVSEC 1/36/97; T. Asad, The Kababish Arabs: Power, Authority and Consent in
a Nomadic Tribe (London, 1970), 157–79; Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 70, 185.
12 ‘The regularisation of the Kababish tribal administration’, with de Bunsen, ADC
Soderi to Governor Kordofan, 1 Jan. 1934, NRO CIVSEC 1/36/97; Hogg, ‘Memoir of
Soderi ’, SAD 815/11/7-32, 17; Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 25, 28.
13 The exception, and the retreat from it, is recorded in R. Davies, ‘Policy in Dar
Kababish’, 9 June 1915, SAD 627/1/1-21.
14 Statement, Khadija bti Hamid, June 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9; this can be
compared with Ali Salim’s account, expressed in de Bunsen, ADC Soderi to Governor
Kordofan, 21 Nov. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
15 Statement, Abbadi Ali (in Arabic), 29 May 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
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diﬀered considerably. Abbadi Ali claimed that he had presented family
witnesses who testiﬁed that he and Khadija were still married. According to
him, Ali el Tom told him he would not get his wife back, and dismissively
oﬀered him one pound in compensation; one of his statements also alleged
that his brother-in-law had been ‘threatened’ in the court for insisting that
Khadija was already married. Interestingly, this detail was omitted from his
second statement, which was translated into English.16 Ali el Tom, on the
other hand, claimed that he had convened a formal meeting of the Kababish
court (of which there seems to have been no record) which investigated
Abbadi Ali’s complaint and found that there was no evidence that he was still
married to Khadija.17
Abbadi Ali, enraged, left Ali el Tom’s camp (in the west of Dar Kababish)
and travelled back east, picking up Khadija on the way. He went on, out of
Dar Kababish, to Omdurman, where he went to see the Muslim judge, the
qadi, at theMuhammedan Law Court, orMLC. The qadiwas in a quandary;
he had no authority to deal with this case (for reasons which will be discussed
below) but Abbadi’s story alarmed him, and he wrote to the oﬃce of the
Legal Secretary, under whose supervision the MLCs operated, asking for
advice. Ali el Tom, meanwhile, had heard news of Abbadi Ali’s ﬂight. He
reported to the police that Abbadi Ali had abducted Khadija, and asked that
he be arrested; and he locked up various members of Khadija’s family and
made it known that they would not be released until Abbadi Ali and Khadija
returned to Dar Kababish.18 But it was too late; the Acting Legal Secretary
refused to order Abbadi Ali’s forcible return to Dar Kababish.19 He also
authorized the qadi to investigate the case, and sent enquiring letters to the
Governor of Kordofan.20
This immediately inﬂamed the chronically sensitive relationship between
the Legal Secretary, as head of the judiciary, and the Civil Secretary, who
was head of the Sudan Political Service (SPS), the cadre of administrators.
As Martin Daly has shown, the policy of devolution had allowed the civil
secretaryship to accrue power up to the mid-1930s at the expense of the legal
secretaryship, and the Civil Secretary responded to what seemed in eﬀect to
be a challenge to this.21 He protested that the investigation represented in-
terference; and after a fewweeks theLegal Secretary returned from leave, and
ordered the qadi to drop the case – which had anyway been frustrated be-
cause it was not possible for the qadi to get evidence from any party except
Abbadi Ali and Khadija.22 Abbadi was ordered to return to Dar Kababish,
where his appeal would be heard by the Assistant District Commissioner
16 Statements, Abbadi Ali, 29 May 1936 (in Arabic) and 3 June 1936 (translated into
English), NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
17 De Bunsen, ADC Soderi to Governor Kordofan, 21 Nov. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC
41/1/9.
18 Petition, Abbadi Ali, 1 Nov. 1936; de Bunsen, ADC Soderi to Governor Kordofan,
21 Nov. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
19 Acting CS to Governor Kordofan, 5 Aug. 1936, 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
20 Acting Legal Secretary (LS) to Governor Kordofan, 6 June 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC
41/1/9.
21 M.W. Daly, Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934
(Cambridge, 1986), 273–4, 349–50.
22 LS to CS, 29 July 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
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(ADC), acting on the advice of the qadi from the district headquarters at Bara
(there being no qadi in Dar Kababish).23 Abbadi Ali duly returned, and was
promptly ordered to enter a bond of £E50 not to leave Dar Kababish again.
The ADC, Charles de Bunsen, then left on trek, without setting any date for
hearing the appeal. De Bunsen himself later claimed that he had misunder-
stood his instructions, and had thought he had been ordered not to hear the
appeal. After three months languishing, with Khadija in hiding with relatives
and various members of her family still detained, Abbadi Ali broke bond and
returned to Omdurman to petition the Legal Secretary.24 This produced
more rapid progress; de Bunsen announced that he had re-read the instruc-
tions, understood them and was now setting about hearing the appeal – while
complaining bitterly that Abbadi Ali had broken bond.
The accounts of the appeal are also a little contradictory. De Bunsen de-
scribed convening a council, or meglis, of local notables who decided that
Abbadi Ali and Khadija were married, and that Ali Salim had been the vic-
tim of duplicity by Khadija’s family, who had sought to make money by
marrying her oﬀ to this unsuspecting, wealthy, man. The qadi, according to
de Bunsen, had been unable to give advice and was ‘sent back to Bara at once,
at his own request’.25 De Bunsen’s replacement, Philip Hogg, who had just
arrived to take over the sub-district, wrote a retrospective account in which
the decision was actually the result of investigation by a police inspector,
whose ﬁndings were merely conﬁrmed by the meglis. The police inspector,
however, suggested that it was Ali Salim who had bribed Khadija’s family to
lie, because he wished to marry her.26 This opinion did not make its way into
de Bunsen’s oﬃcial account, or into the written account of the meglis de-
cision. Both of these laid the blame entirely on Khadija’s family, and rec-
ommended that not only should they refund the bridewealth – now alleged
to have been £E31 and 24 sheep – but that they should also be punished for
lying.27 De Bunsen insisted that this punishment should be set not by himself
but by the court of Ali el Tom. He wrote: ‘ [Ali el Tom] is anxious that those
who misled his relations should be punished, in his court. He says that he
does not wish to give them heavy sentences, but that the tribe should see and
realize that he had ‘‘hukmed’’ them’. De Bunsen emphasized the point, and
repeated the use of the key word: ‘all of them deserve to be ‘‘hukmed’’ for
their lying and misleading Ali Salim’.28
De Bunsen’s desire to allow the further punishment of Khadija’s family
was gratiﬁed – though the provincial governor did not pursue the wistful
hope, expressed in the same letter, that Abbadi Ali himself might be pun-
ished for not having followed the proper procedures for complaint. And
there the story ended despite a brief ﬂurry of interest, and an evident
awareness among oﬃcials in Khartoum, including the Deputy Civil
Secretary, that ‘a grave miscarriage of justice has taken place’.29 Abbadi Ali
23 Acting CS to Governor Kordofan, 5 Aug. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
24 Petitions, Abbadi Ali, 1, 4 and 5 Nov. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
25 De Bunsen, ADC Dar Kababish to Governor Kordofan, 21 Nov. 1936, NRO
1CIVSEC 41/1/9. 26 Hogg, ‘Memoir of Soderi ’, SAD 815/11/7-33.
27 ‘Translation of meglis decision’, Nov. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
28 De Bunsen, ADC Dar Kababish to Governor Kordofan, 21 Nov. 1936, 1CIVSEC
41/1/9. 29 Minute, Deputy CS, 10 Dec. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
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and Khadija were reunited – but at substantial cost to Khadija’s family, and
with the uncomfortable knowledge that they had earned the enmity of the
rulers of Dar Kababish. Local administrators quickly set about minimizing
the impact of these events – reminding their superiors, on every possible
occasion, that this was the ﬁrst time that any complaint had ever been made
by a Kababish against the rule of Ali el Tom, and insisting that the aﬀair had
received far more attention than it deserved.30
The exceptionality of the case is striking. There really were no other
recorded complaints from Kababish, though plenty of people from neigh-
bouring groups had complained of Ali el Tom’s behaviour.31 But it might be
argued that the case was more signiﬁcant than de Bunsen and his colleagues
allowed, for it oﬀers a unique window on to the processes which made Dar
Kababish such an apparently tranquil domain. Multiple questions are raised
by the story of Abbadi Ali : about the willingness of administrators to con-
done evident injustice, and the ultimate willingness of senior oﬃcials to
accept this; about Ali el Tom’s apparent willingness to ﬂout both Muslim
law and Kababish custom. In essence, all these recur to the apparent
uniqueness of the case: can the story of Khadija and Abbadi Ali help us to
understand why no one else ever complained to the government about Ali el
Tom? It is a reformulation of the question which Talal Asad addressed in his
work on the Kababish, which Chanock has identiﬁed as a wider issue, and to
which Thomas Spear has recently returned in his essay on the ‘limits of
invention’: why was an exploitative and actually innovatory ‘customary’ rule
accepted by those upon whom it was imposed?32
There is one obvious answer. These events certainly suggest the extent
to which British support for Ali el Tom made resistance to his rule both
diﬃcult and foolhardy, oﬀering a clear example of what some have seen as
the invention of despotic neo-traditional rule in colonial Africa – indeed,
an unusually clear example.33 This paper will suggest that this example
enhances our understanding of that process, by illustrating the way in which
it was morally and intellectually possible for this to happen, for Sudanese and
British involved in the processes of rule. But it also illustrates the bounds of
that process.
Asad has oﬀered two lines of explanation for Kababish acceptance of Ali el
Tom’s rule. He argued that there was no ‘consent’ involved; it was rather
that Kababish men accepted Ali el Tom’s rule as legitimate, in so far as it
served their principal interest, which was the maintenance of a domestic
sphere, in which the male-headed household was an autonomous economic
unit.34 But he also laid much stress on the Kababish idea of sulta, the power
30 De Bunsen, ADC Dar Kababish to Governor Kordofan, 21 Nov. 1936, 1CIVSEC
41/1/9; de Bunsen, handing-over notes, 1936, SAD G//S 1204 ﬁle 6.
31 The absence of any complaint from Dar Kababish was noted in 1915, and reaﬃrmed
by later observers: Davies, ‘Report on Dar Kababish’, SAD 627/1/1-21. For complaints
from non-Kababish, see Mukhabarat to Mudir, Kordofan, 21 Apr. 1907; note on
‘Lahawiin tribe and Sh. Ali Tom’, n.d., in NRO INTEL 2/34/87.
32 Asad, The Kababish, xiii–xvi; Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order, ix; T. Spear,
‘Neo-traditionalism and the limits of invention in British colonial Africa’, Journal of
African History, 44 (2003), 3–27.
33 For the ‘decentralized despotism’ of the colonial state, see Mamdani, Citizen and
Subject, 37–61. 34 Asad, The Kababish, 1, 157, 230–46.
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to rule; he argued that in Kababish eyes the Awlad Fadlallah were set apart
by the possession of sulta, and that this in turn entitled them to possess it.
This, of course, has echoes of arguments about the ‘premise of inequality’ in
interlacustrine Africa, though Asad did not oﬀer the comparison to
Maquet.35 There is some danger of tautology in that argument (as Asad
himself noted);36 and the concern in this paper is rather with the particular
processes of colonial rule which created a novel kind of authority, yet made it
acceptable – that is, with the creation of Kababish identity as, in Asad’s
memorable phrase ‘an experience of structured inequality’.37 This article
will suggest that Khadija and Abbadi’s case revealed one stage in the pro-
cesses through which a novel power of ‘hukm’ was deﬁned and exercised.
There are two aspects to this story. One concerns the interaction between
British oﬃcials and the ambitions of Ali el Tom and his family. It was this
which was to produce the formal structures which embodied the Kababish
hukm, and which led British oﬃcials to exclude this hukm from their moral
judgement – in eﬀect suspending the ‘repugnancy’ criteria which suppos-
edly constrained customary law.38 The second concerns wider Kababish
ideas about disputes and their resolution, and the location of justice, which
allowed the creeping advance of hukm but could also deﬁne the terms in
which this could be exercised.
ALI EL TOM: ‘THE PARFAIT GENTIL KNIGHT’39
Ali el Tom – ‘AT’, as he was routinely abbreviated by administrators – was
by 1936 a legendary ﬁgure. Descended from a line of hereditary rulers, his
father and uncle had been killed by the Mahdists in the 1880s; his uncle had
the unusual distinction of having inspired a character in a G. A. Henty
novel.40 Ali el Tom was recognized as ruler of the Kababish by the British
as soon as they took control of Kordofan in 1900: a recognition that was seen
by the British as a restoration, just as the occupation of the Sudan was a
‘reconquest’. Since that time – after a brief period of uncertainty – Ali el
Tom had grown in authority and reputation, particularly among the Britons
of the administrative branch of the Sudan government – the SPS. Early
allegations that he abused his power were deﬂected by sympathetic provincial
governors: ‘Ali Tom is one of the best Arab sheikhs I know, keeps his people
in great order and pays his tribute always to the day and very [sic] obedient to
any orders I give him’.41 In 1919 he was a member of the Loyalty Delegation
which travelled to congratulate King George on the British victory; he was
honoured ﬁrst as a Member of the Victoria Order, then with the King’s
Medal for African Chiefs, and then ﬁnally as a Knight of the Order of the
British Empire. His abbreviation thenceforth took the more reverential form,
35 Ibid. 241–2; R. Maquet, The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda: A Study of Political
Relations in a Central African Kingdom (London, 1961).
36 T. Asad, ‘Political inequality in the Kababish tribe’, in I. Cunnison and W. James
(eds.), Essays in Sudan Ethnography (London, 1972), 126–48.
37 Asad, ‘Political inequality ’, 128.
38 Roberts and Mann, ‘Law in colonial Africa’, 13.
39 A description from Hogg, ‘Memoir of Soderi ’, SAD 815/11/7-32.
40 G. A. Henty, The Dash for Khartoum: A Tale of the Nile Expedition (London, 1892),
297–8. 41 Governor Kordofan to CS, 24 June 1903, NRO INTEL 2/34/87.
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‘Sir AT’,42 and by the 1930s, young British oﬃcials struggled to straighten
their ties and uniforms when he approached; older and more senior Britons
treated him as a conﬁdant, and arranged to send a private teacher to establish
a ‘nomad school’ for his children so that they should not be spoiled by urban
education.43 Daly’s edited version of one young administrator’s journals
gives ample evidence of how all these oﬃcials routinely conspired to conceal
various of Ali el Tom’s activities which contravened the law more or less
seriously: his systematized levying of extra-legal taxes, his use of convicted
prisoners as a personal labour force and his dogged resistance to government
eﬀorts to punish Kababish possession of, and traﬃc in, slaves.44
That traditional rulers could wield judicial authority had been assumed
from the start of British rule, and it was in Kordofan that oﬃcial recognition
had ﬁrst been granted to such authority.45 But from the start, oﬃcials had
agreed that in the case of Ali el Tom such recognition should not be
granted – because this would ‘set limits to his punitive powers’, in itself
undesirable.46 With the elevation of ‘ indirect rule’ to dogma in the 1920s, Ali
el Tom had become the epitome of the ‘uneducated but loyal and inﬂuential
nomad sheikhs’ who were to be the basis of authority, and policy had focused
on courts as the ﬁrst area in which extensive ‘decentralization’ or ‘devol-
ution’ (the vogue terms of the period) could be eﬀectively pursued.47This led
to a steady elaboration and codiﬁcation of ‘native administration’, which
began with the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance in 1922 and culminated
in the Native Courts Ordinance of 1932. The explicit intention of all this
legislation was both to preserve and ‘revive’: ‘ to give the existing Tribal
Custom a yet surer form of recognition’, but also to extend and reform the
power of ‘traditional’ rulers.48 Enamoured as they were of ‘tradition’,
British administrators were quite open about their intention to invent where
necessary, and to push for a steady growth in scale. ‘Traditional’ units
which were too small were not viable, they argued – they could not operate
economically (and economy was a constant theme, with all suggestions for
‘devolution’ supported by complicated tables detailing the savings in costs
which would result) ; nor could they survive in the face of wider social
change. Courts must embody tradition – but they had also to assist in the
remaking of tradition, and in the creation of larger ‘tribes’.49
42 For a potted biography, see the obituary, evidently written by Douglas Newbold, in
Kordofan Monthly Diary, Feb. 1938, NRO 1CIVSEC 57/8/32.
43 Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 31; R. Davies, The Camel’s Back (London, 1957), 188–9;
‘Education of Sh. Ali el Tom’s sons’, 3 Feb. 1931, NRO 1CIVSEC 17/6/28.
44 Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, for example 282–6.
45 Sagar, Governor Kordofan to CS, 26 May 1920, NRO 1CIVSEC1/9/30.
46 Davies, ‘Report on Dar Kababish’, 9 June 1915, SAD 627/1/1-21.
47 For the idealization of the nomad, see Annual Report, Intelligence Department,
1924, in Public Record Oﬃce (PRO) WO 33/999; Davies to all governors, 12 Dec. 1928,
NRO 1CIVSEC 1/33/90.
48 Acting Governor Kordofan to CS, 1 Nov. 1928, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/33/90.
49 Governor Kordofan to CS, 13 Oct. 1927; NRO 1CIVSEC 1/33/89; Davies,
‘Further steps in devolution’, 20 Jan. 1930, NRO Kordofan 1/1/1. For the emphasis
on economy, see Acting Governor Kordofan to CS, 4 Sept. 1928; CS to Financial
Secretary, 15 Oct. 1928, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/33/90.
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Yet at the same time, and in spite of their insistence that judicial authority
had lain always in the hands of the ‘patriarchal ’ head of ‘tribe’, British
administrators suspected the courts, for they feared that they would intro-
duce a culture of authority which might subvert ‘tradition’. Strikingly, faced
with the possibility that the elimination of injustice and corruption might
endanger tradition, administrators were explicit in their insistence that a
degree of corruption and injustice was tolerable: ‘ it can hardly be doubted
that there will be a great deal of favouritism, bias and corruption when
Native Administration has become normal routine’.50 The feeling against
‘over-formalization’ was most evident in northern Kordofan. Here, local
administrators repeated the argument made some years earlier, that formal
recognition would compromise Ali el Tom’s judicial authority, for recog-
nition required deﬁnition, and deﬁnition implied limitation: ‘to regularise
with warrants and rules what is now naturally there might wreck it ’, opined
one District Commissioner.51 Laws required the issue of warrants for courts,
explicitly stating what cases might be heard in them (routinely excluding
slavery and homicide cases from their jurisdiction). They laid down the
permissible limits of punishment. Most worryingly of all, they came to re-
quire that all judgements be recorded in writing, and ﬁnes taken as punish-
ment be recorded and accounted for.52 And so neither the 1922 ordinance,
nor any of the legislation which followed it, was immediately applied to Dar
Kababish.
Administrators in Kordofan found all these provisions diﬃcult because
they ran directly counter to their understanding of how Ali el Tom’s auth-
ority worked. As they repeatedly argued – on occasion, quoting from
Doughty’s Arabia Deserta as authoritative evidence on the subject – Ali el
Tom was the embodiment of a social order which despised regulation and
functioned solely on honour.53 This was the untouched world of the desert
nomad, where wise and just judgements sprang from an inherited sense
of right and a commitment to shared values which was maintained by the
purity of nomad life. As the provincial governor who penned Ali el Tom’s
obituary wrote, ‘AT’ was ‘simple in his habits, direct in speech, tireless in
the saddle and expert in camels and grazing and on nomad Arab customs and
rights’.54 In some cases, administrators knew, Ali el Tom gave judgements,
or inﬂicted punishments, which would exceed any legally acceptable
deﬁnition of the bounds of his authority. If he were to become a ‘table
Sultan’ – constrained by warrants, hemmed in by the recording and scrutiny
of decisions – his freedom of action would be lost and this system of
50 MacMichael, CS, to Governor Kordofan, 23 Mar. 1929, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/33/92.
51 ‘Notes on native court for Soderi District ’, Hamilton, DC Bara, 7 Jan. 1929, NRO
1CIVSEC 1/33/92. ‘Over-formalization’ was explicitly identiﬁed as a danger in Gillan,
Governor Kordofan to CS, 27 Aug. 1930, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/35/94.
52 Craig, for CS to all governors, 8 Nov. 1928; see draft warrants with Acting Governor
Kordofan to CS, 3 Sept. 1928, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/33/90.
53 C. M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta (2 vols.) (London, 1881); this was, as
T. E. Lawrence’s foreword to the 1921 reissue by Jonathan Cape explained, ‘the ﬁrst and
indispensable work upon the Arabs of the desert’.
54 Kordofan Province Monthly Diary, Feb. 1938, NRO 1CIVSEC 57/8/32.
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unquestioned, honourable, justice would be imperilled.55 Reginald Davies,
one of Ali el Tom’s most enthusiastic supporters, wrote that ‘the powers
actually wielded by certain sheikhs, notably the nazir of the Kababish tribe,
were so much greater than anything which could be sanctioned under the
Ordinance that there was no alternative to ignoring them’.56
British administrators, then, were genuinely spellbound by Ali el Tom,
and by their belief in the code of honourwhich they believed him to represent.
Yet they were also convinced of the fragility of this code, and were haunted
by the fear – which steadily hardened into a conviction – that it could not
survive the passing of Ali el Tom himself. By the 1930s, administrators in the
provincial capital at El Obeid, as well as those in northern Kordofan itself,
were fretting over what the future might bring: challenges to AT from
tribesmen spoiled by contact with the town; a successor to AT who
commanded less respect, and had a less sure grasp of the sense of honour?
And so, with a gloomy sense that nothing they might do would ever equal
the simplicity and fairness of the system they were replacing, they began
to introduce the formal structure of courts to the Kababish.57
Ali el Tom had clearly expressed his distaste for formal courts; and his fear
of supervision was so great that he had suspected that the teacher supplied
for his children by the government might be some sort of spy.58 But he did
not resist the push to ‘regularize’ his rule. Indeed, towards the end of the
negotiations he actually oﬀered to bear personally any additional costs associ-
ated with the introduction of formal courts.59 He did so for two reasons. On
the one hand, he was well aware of the ways in which the colonial state had
provided means for him to extend his wealth and inﬂuence, notably through
the manipulation of the taxation system – he did not wish to lose his favoured
position. On the other hand, there really was an issue of honour at stake. Both
Ali el Tom and his subjects had become uncomfortably aware that elsewhere
in Kordofan status was increasingly judged through reference to the formal
structure of the courts. The details of sentencing powers, and the subordi-
nation of one court to another, were keenly observed.60 When members of
other tribes stole from, oﬀended or injured Kababish; or when Kababish
were accused of oﬀences against others, Ali el Tom was confronted with
other nazirs whose formally recognized powers were much greater than his
own.61 This compounded the aﬀront which had long been oﬀered to Ali el
Tom by non-Kababish who lived in and around the area which he regarded
as Dar Kababish. He had no formal power over such people. In particular, he
55 Extract from Kordofan Monthly Intelligence Report, Apr. 1930, NRO 1CIVSEC
1/35/94.
56 Davies, ‘Further steps in devolution’, 20 Jan. 1930, NRO Kordofan 1/1/1.
57 ‘The regularization of the Kababish Tribal Administration’, attached, de Bunsen to
Governor Kordofan, 1 Jan. 1934, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/36/97.
58 As noted by the teacher involved: Hasan Nagila, Dhikrayati ﬁ’l Badiyya (Beirut,
1964), 23–33: I am much indebted to Dr Fadwa Taha, who translated the whole of this
account into English.
59 De Bunsen, ADC Soderi to Governor, 1 Jan. 1934, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/36/97.
60 Gillan, Governor to CS, 25 July 1929, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/34/93; Newbold,
Governor to DC Western Kordofan, 23 July 1933, and Acting Governor to CS, 5 Oct.
1933, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/36/96.
61 ‘Report of a meeting with Sh. Sir Ali el Tom’, n.d., 1932, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/35/95.
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was concerned by the Kawahla, who had until theMahdiyya been considered
a section of the Kababish but had in those turbulent years established a
separate identity and authority, which had been maintained by a series of
stubborn Kawahla nazirs since the Reconquest. AT had, generally speaking,
run rings around the Kawahla nazirs, consistently outdoing them in securing
the favour of British administrators.62 Yet the Kawahla as a group remained
independent, to Ali el Tom’s annoyance.63
In prolonged negotiations, pursued over some three years between 1931
and 1934, Ali el Tom adroitly turned British concerns to his advantage,
securing an arrangement which brought him formally into the structures
of indirect rule in return for some extraordinary concessions.64 He was to
become, like other nazirs, a salaried oﬃcial – but on a salary, £E1,450, which
substantially exceeded that paid to any other nazir. He had the right to
appoint a series of other salaried deputies, or wakils, as well as retainers, and
he would sit as the president of a Kababish court which would have three
subordinate courts; and it was in eﬀect promised to him that in the near
future the Kawahla court would be added to these subordinate courts – a
promise that was made good within a year, with British administrators also
making clear that they intended to bring other minor groups under his court
in the near future: ‘ in the course of time, Dar el Kababish should comprise
only one unit, under Sir AT’.65 The Kababish nazir was given the largest
powers of sentencing possible. And, discreetly, administrators – evidently
acting with the approval of their superiors – indicated that they would not
expect of his court the kind of detailed record-keeping which was required of
others.
Sh. Ali asked whether, under the proposed Native Administration, he would have
to write down and treat as ‘cases’ all the various small oﬀences which he at present
deals with merely by imposing some ‘slavish’ task on the guilty party, such as
drawing water or hewing wood. Mr Lea replied that the Government wanted
nothing better than to leave the Kababish to be dealt with according to their
customary justice so long as crime was kept down and the tribe remained
contented.66
Thus was created Ali el Tom’s hukm, a power to judge which was not
‘traditional’ – but was also not subject to the rule of the law. This was
‘regularization’ without regularity.
The practice of these courts, and their physical nature, were to follow a
pattern already suggested for other Arab nomad courts in Kordofan. This
62 Sarsﬁeld-Hall, ‘Diary of trip in Northern Kordofan, 1923’, SAD 680/8/1-15, com-
pare entries for 27 Feb. and 2 Mar.
63 Intelligence Department, Kordofan and the Region to the West of the White Nile
(London, 1912), 30, 42; H. MacMichael, The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan
(Cambridge, 1912), 201; Sarsﬁeld-Hall to MacMichael, 13 Jan. 1927, NRO CIVSEC
41/1/7; Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 124–5.
64 For the negotiations, see for example Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 275–7.
65 SudanMonthly Record, nos. 74 and 75, Feb.–Mar. andMar.–Apr. 1935 (in Durham
University Library); De Bunsen, handing-over notes, 1936, SAD G//S1204 ﬁle 6.
66 ‘The regularisation of the Kababish Tribal Administration’, attached to de Bunsen
to governor, 1 Jan. 1934, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/36/97. This possibility had already been
raised by higher oﬃcials: Gillan, Governor Kordofan to CS, 18 Apr. 1930, NRO
Kordofan 1/1/1.
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was intended to avoid the ‘ imitation of a Government oﬃce’ ; spurning
tables and chairs and oﬃcious men in uniform, and embodying a culture
of collective decision-taking; some administrators had tried their best to
discourage use of the term mehakim for these ‘courts’, and to insist – in
correspondence, and in articles for Sudan Notes and Records, the compen-
dium of oﬃcial ‘knowledge’ about the governed – that they should be called
meglis.67 In practice, in Dar Kababish at least, this ideal of the collective
wisdom of elders yielded to a reality in which the court president exercised
an individual power to punish and judge. The teacher who travelled with
Ali el Tom had described Ali el Tom’s settling of cases before the
‘regularization’ – AT sat alone on a rope bed, the focus of activity, while all
others sat on the ground before him.68 There seems to have been no im-
mediate change to this practice after 1934, and administrators were repeat-
edly to stress how Ali el Tom himself bore personally a vast burden of
judicial work: ‘Sir Ali el Tom had an almost continuous 30 hours session of
settling unimportant disputes at Um Badr’.69 But in material appearance,
and rhetoric, the native administration courts were intended to stand in clear
contrast to another kind of court recognized by the Condominium, which
was regarded by the administrators of Kordofan as the embodiment of all the
most baleful aspects of formal bureaucracy – the MLC.
Accepted, and even encouraged, by British administrators in the ﬁrst two
decades of the Condominium (when they saw formally trained Muslim
scholars as the essential antidote to populist holy men on the model of the
Mahdi), the MLCs had fallen into severe disfavour with the formalization of
indirect rule in the 1920s.70 As the SPS set about the creation of a local
administration rooted in the power of ‘traditional’ justice, the existence of an
alternative legal system became extremely problematic, even though the
operations of the MLC were largely conﬁned to ‘matters of personal status’.
Would the power of shaykhs and nazirs not be undermined if their subjects
could turn from their courts and seek instead the judgement of the MLC
in disputes over marriage and inheritance?71 That the judges of the MLCs
were often graduates of the qadi school at Gordon College only served to
intensify this concern: they were representatives of the formally educated
eﬀendiyya class whose loyalty had been shown to be suspect in the turbulent
years of the Egyptian revolution and the White Flag revolt ; ‘young and
half-educated lawyers’ of the kind whom many British administrators
despised.72
The SPS, supported by the oﬃce of the Civil Secretary, fought a deter-
mined campaign to oust the MLCs, at least from rural areas, and preferably
67 Report, Hamilton, attached to Gillan, Governor to all DCs, 5 Nov. 1930, and
Hamilton, ‘Native administration courts’, May 1931, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/35/94;
J. Reid and J. Maclaren, ‘Arab court procedure and customary law’, Sudan Notes and
Records, 19 (1936), 158–61. 68 Nagila, Dhikrayati, 23–33.
69 Kordofan Province Monthly Diary, June 1937, NRO 1CVSEC 57/5/21.
70 G. Warburg, Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya (London,
2003), 64–8.
71 Acting Governor Kordofan to CS, 12 May 1930, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/35/94.
72 The ‘young and half-educated’ jibe comes from Governor Kordofan to CS, 26 May
1920, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/9/30.
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from small towns too.73 Qadis were accused of making tours through rural
areas to ‘tout for business’, in competition with traditional rulers’ courts;
and they were accused too of using the Muslim recorders, or maazuns, as
agents to extend their inﬂuence. Most revealingly, it was said that MLCs had
an advantage over native administration courts because they possessed
‘Government prestige and atmosphere’.74 The chief qadi, and the oﬃce of
the Legal Secretary, resisted this administrative campaign; the chief qadi
based his argument on the simple principle that Muslims should, if they
wish, have the right to have marriage and inheritance cases heard according
to sharia law; the Legal Secretary argued that abolishing the MLCs would
oﬀend the eﬀendiyya too greatly to be worth trying.75 The SPS nonetheless
succeeded in restricting the physical movement of the qadis, speciﬁcally
excluding Dar Kababish from their operations. They were also successful in
incorporating in many court warrants a general proviso that the courts of
nazirs and shaykhs could hear cases which were subject to sharia law as long
as they convened a panel which contained a member ‘learned in sharia’, and
as long as the parties to the case consented – which, in practice, came to mean
as long as they did not make very clear and obvious objection.76 Once they
had ‘consented’, the case could never go before an MLC – the appeal from
shaykhs’ and nazirs’ courts were to the District Commissioner, not to the
qadi, whatever the nature of the case.
The Kababish courts created in 1934 contained such provisos in their
warrants, and it was clear that administrators understood them to be the
antithesis of the MLCs, and intended that there should be no overlap or
contact of any kind between the systems.77 That was why Abbadi Ali’s
attempt to secure the help of the qadi at Omdurman was ultimately
unsuccessful – he had no jurisdiction in this case. And it was also why de
Bunsen seems to have been so reluctant to hear the appeal with the qadi from
Bara present, even though he had been instructed to seek his advice. To
involve the qadi in this way would have been to accept the possibility that
another system of justice might challenge that of Ali el Tom. Hence the rapid
dismissal of the qadi and the summoning of the meglis (whose four members,
incidentally, included Ali el Tom’s son and Ali bin Salim’s father).78
De Bunsen and his immediate superiors harked back repeatedly to their
argument that Abbadi Ali himself had caused much of the problem by not
73 Gillan, Governor Kordofan to LS, via CS, 24 Feb. 1929, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/33/92;
Davies, ‘Further steps in devolution’, 20 Jan. 1930, and Kordofan response to ques-
tionnaire on devolution, n.d. 1931, NRO Kordofan 1/1/1.
74 Mayall, DC En Nahud to Governor Kordofan, 21 Dec. 1928, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/33/
92; Gillan, Governor Kordofan to CS, 10 Apr. 1930, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/34/93.
75 LS to CS, 30 Apr. 1930; ‘Note by Grand Kadi’, 17 May 1931 NRO 1CIVSEC
1/35/94; minutes of meeting at the Palace, 10 Nov. 1929; CS to all governors, 17 Nov.
1929, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/34/93.
76 See for example Rules, with Gillan, Governor Kordofan to CS, 29 June 1929, NRO
1CIVSEC 1/34/93. For Dar Kababish, see ‘Minutes of a meeting of certain governors at
Khartoum’, 2–5 Dec. 1930, NRO Kordofan 1/1/1.
77 Specimen warrant in NRO CIVSEC 1/36/97; note by Hamilton, DC Bara, 7 Feb.
1934, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/36/97.
78 ‘Translation of meglis decision’, 13 Nov. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9. De Bunsen
omitted Salim Bilal’s name from the membership of the meglis in his report to the
Governor.
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following the proper procedures for appeal, and by going to the MLC.79 The
ﬁnal act of the story, with Khadija’s family being handed over to AT’s court
to be ‘hukmed’ for having resisted bullying by AT’s relatives, was an
absolute assertion of administrators’ beliefs about the nature and location of
hukm. Ali el Tom possessed the power to hukm ; his people were absolutely
subject to that power, and his power to hukm was to be supported, rather
than qualiﬁed, by the police inspector, the DC and the government as a
whole. As de Bunsen cheerfully observed, in notes written just after the
Abbadi Ali case:
Sir AT’s own main court should be left without undue interference except in
improving the entering of cases and the paying-in of ﬁnes (as long is justice is
dispensed the ﬁrst is not an intrinsically important matter …).80
JUSTICE, HONOUR AND IDENTITY IN NORTHERN KORDOFAN
From the early years of the Condominium, British administrators had
asserted the ‘traditional ’ basis of the judicial system operated by their chosen
agents. But as Asad’s work has shown, the process which administrators had
seen as one of ‘regularization’, and even of reduction of his powers, might be
better understood as the creation, consolidation and expansion of a judicial
identity for the Kababish which had never previously existed.81
No evidence has ever really been oﬀered to show that that there was any
kind of central dispensation of justice for the Kababish in the nineteenth
century. Despite the orotund certainty of the assertion (embedded in the
1922 Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance) that Arab nomad sheikhs had
wielded judicial power ‘since time immemorial ’, at least some colonial ad-
ministrators were actually well aware that Kababish identity was a relatively
recent construct, and that individuals and whole sections (or ‘clans’, as some
would call them) moved in and out of this identity. HaroldMacMichael, who
produced some of the most fulsome prose on the subject of the enduring
patriarchy of nomad Arabism, also went to some lengths to insist that the
Kababish were a ‘highly complex conglomeration of component parts’.82 As
Daly drily notes, some of the enthusiasts of native administration who cited
MacMichael’s work either ‘had not read it or hoped that their readers had
not’.83
The very limited sources for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
all suggest, in fact, that the system of justice and the resolution of dis-
putes in northern Kordofan were both layered and decentralized.84 Under
79 Newbold, Governor Kordofan to CS, 16 Nov. 1936, NRO 1CIVSEC 41/1/9.
80 De Bunsen, handing-over notes, 1936, SAD G//S1204 ﬁle 6.
81 Asad, The Kababish, 157–79.
82 MacMichael, The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan, 172–99. MacMichael
devoted an entire article to demonstrating the complexity of Kababish origins: ‘The
Kababish: some remarks on the ethnology of a Sudan Arab tribe’, Journal of the
Anthropological Institute, 40 (1910), 215–31.
83 M. Daly, ‘Great white chief : H. A. MacMichael and the tribes of Kordofan’, in
E. Stiansen andM. Kevane (eds.),Kordofan Invaded! Peripheral Incorporation and Social
Transformation in Islamic Africa (Leiden, 1998), 99–119, at 106.
84 Asad, ‘Political inequality’, 128.
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Turco-Egyptian rule, several of Ali el-Tom’s family had been recognized as
shaykh al-mashaykh of ‘the Kababish’ – an entirely novel position and title,
as Bjorkelo points out – but this recognition seems to have involved princi-
pally the responsibility to negotiate with the representative of the govern-
ment based at Bara, who collected tax and organized contracts for the
transport of gum arabic on Kababish-owned camels. It was the relationship
that gave the shaykh al-mashaykh his power: ‘The great chief alone oppresses
them, but this he is enabled to do from his inﬂuence with the Turks’.85 There
is no evidence that the crucial areas of potential dispute – over access to
grazing and water, over the location and return of strayed or stolen livestock,
over marriage or inheritance disputes, over the control of slaves – were dealt
with by the shaykh al-mashaykh, or involved any reference to the idea of
Kababish identity. In 1911, the Seligmans found that it was heads of sections
who played the crucial role in most dispute settlements – not the nazirs, and
this presumably had also been true in the nineteenth century. This was a
society for which the idea of a collective identity served principally as a
means to regulate relations with the happily distant Turks, or occasionally to
organize resistance to grand acts of hostility by other ‘tribes’, notably the
Beni Jerar.86
The role of Islam in settling disputes in the nineteenth century is even
more uncertain. The feki, with a limited degree of Islamic knowledge and
some mastery of writing and geomancy, was not a common feature of
Kababish society, but by the early twentieth century some of these in-
dividuals were involved in the magical detection of thieves; there were
however no mosques and no resident learned scholarly community. There
were certain people and places in the region possessed of a degree of signiﬁ-
cance, which could be used to administer oaths to help settle disputes: a
shrine at Bara and a pilgrimage site on the Nile. By 1918 fekis had become
more common; Ali el Tom himself had developed a particular relationship
with a lineage of fekis belonging to the Tijaniyya order, but it is not clear how
recent this development was.87
The creation, from this unpromising start, of a hukm which covered a
deﬁned area evidently owed much to British enthusiasm for the Kababish,
and Ali el Tom in particular. This gave Ali el Tom a new control over re-
sources, backed by the known, if erratic, ability of the British to use their
police to enforce decisions relating to water and grazing access – an ability
demonstrated most dramatically in the forcible expulsion of the Hawawir
from Dar Kababish in 1913–14, and shown again in 1926 when the Gumuiya
were forced to acknowledge Ali el Tom’s rights over the grazing land which
85 M. Parkyns, ‘The Kubbabish Arabs between Dongola and Kordofan’, Journal of the
Royal Geographical Society, 20 (1851), 254–75, at 264; J. Petherick, Egypt, the Soudan and
Central Africa (Edinburgh, 1861), 284; I. Pallme, Travels in Kordofan (London, 1844),
135–8; A. Bjorkelo, Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region,
1821–85 (Cambridge, 1989), 46.
86 C. Seligman and B. Seligman, ‘The Kababish: a Sudan Arab tribe’, Harvard
African Studies, 2 (1918), 105–86; Parkyns, ‘The Kubbabish Arabs’, 259.
87 These rather bare details of religious life are all drawn from Seligman and Seligman,
‘The Kababish’, 105–86; see also Appendix A, SIR 189, Apr. 1910, PRO WO 106/234;
Report from sub-Mamur Khalafalla Eﬀendi Khalid, with Inspector Dar Kababish to
Governor, 24 Mar. 1918, NRO INTEL 2/46/393.
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they used. Those Hawawir or Gumuiya who accepted Ali el Tom’s authority
were allowed access to the resources of Dar Kababish – others were ex-
cluded.88 The tone of negotiations in 1927 between Ali el Tom and the nazir
of the Kawahla suggested that Ali el Tom’s hukmwas steadily extending over
all the nomads who occupied the area – now deﬁned by boundaries on the
map – known as Dar Kababish.89 Just as hukm became expressive of the
expected relationship between nazir and subject, dar – again, a word long in
use, but acquiring new signiﬁcance – came to assert a unique claim to the
resources of a territory, associated with the power of hukm. In 1915, the brief
experiment of collecting tax directly, instead of through Ali el Tom, was
immediately abandoned when it seemed that this might call into question Ali
el Tom’s position as the sole intermediary between Kababish and govern-
ment: at least some oﬃcials were apparently aware of the extent to which
both the Kababish and their leader were innovations, based on this inter-
mediacy.90 Douglas Newbold (who himself enjoyed a substantial change in
circumstance, rising from Assistant District Commissioner Dar Kababish to
Civil Secretary in the course of 16 years) remarked posthumously of his old
friend AT that ‘He made the tribe. He was the tribe’.91 Ali el Tom acquired
an immediate following of clients whom he supported; more widely those
who accepted his power to judge enjoyed access to the resources he con-
trolled, and to his support in disputes with others.92 Those household or
section heads who deﬁed or evaded this authority would lose his support –
and could also ﬁnd the tax lists changed to punish them and encourage
the defection of their followers to Ali el Tom’s own, ever-growing, section.93
The layered world of justice and dispute resolution was steadily ﬂattened
into the singular process of hukm : as de Bunsen had observed in 1934, ‘The
‘‘Government’’ is entirely in the hands of Sir Ali himself ’.94 Davies had
commented in 1915 on the way that Ali el Tom’s authority combined fear
with reward: ‘The Nazir inspires a very real fear in all his people, but at the
same time it is always with obvious pride that a Kabbashi [the singular]
announces himself as belonging to ‘‘Sheikh Ali’’ ’.95
88 Governor Kordofan to Assistant Director of Intelligence, 17 Feb. 1914, NRO
INTEL 2/46/393; Governor Kordofan to Assistant Director of Intelligence, 3 Apr. 1914,
and sub-mamur Kababish to Inspector, 19 May 1914, NRO INTEL 2/35/294; Governor
Kordofan to Governor Khartoum, 10 July 1926, and Acting CS to Governor Khartoum,
4 Feb. 1926, NRO 1 CIVSEC 66/4/30.
89 The Kawahla nazir was particularly anxious to secure Ali el Tom’s assurance that
he would cease to hukmKawahla; the assurance was given, but probably not fulﬁlled: see
the Shurut (binding agreement) attached with ADC Soderi, 4 July 1927, NRO 1CIVSEC
41/1/7.
90 Davies, ‘Report on Dar Kababish’, 9 June 1915, SAD 627/1/1-21 (especially the
section on ‘Future policy’ with marginalia by Wingate).
91 Notes of talk with Douglas Newbold, Margery Perham, 1938: Rhodes House, MSS
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In 1931, there were still section heads who tried to maintain their right to
settle cases, and who were punished by Ali el Tom (and threatened by British
administrators) for doing so.96 But the move away from this was inexorable.
There is very little evidence of the kind of cases which came to the nazir, or
of the identity of the plaintiﬀs – such was Ali el Tom’s success in deﬂecting
scrutiny. A set of scribbled notes from Margery Perham suggest that ‘Arab
courts’ in northern Kordofan dealt very largely in theft cases, with violence
and adultery as substantial minor themes, but it is not clear how she derived
these statistics.97 Anecdotal comments on the sheer volume of business con-
ducted by Ali el Tom’s court suggest that Chanock’s argument – that such
courts dealt largely with cases of disobedience to authority, while domestic
disputes were settled in other ways – does not apply in this case.
This was a period of new strains and challenges in nomad society in
northern Kordofan. There was no signiﬁcant growth in wage employment or
labour migrancy, but there were economic changes. The provision of trans-
port camels, a principal source of income in the nineteenth century, saw one
last glorious boom in the years up to 1915 (delivering particular wealth to Ali
el Tom, who acted as intermediary in supplying camels to government and
took most or all of the proceeds). But the completion of the railway to El
Obeid in 1912 undermined this business, and from the 1920s it was the
sale of camels, for meat or other use, and the sale of sheep, which provided
the bulk of the cash which came into nomad society for paying tax and
buying cloth, sugar and other luxuries.98 Kababish men devoted considerable
energy to building up ﬂocks and herds for this trade – as well as for the sheer
pleasure of owning camels. They were able to build ever larger herds because
Ali el Tom secured them not only preferential access – indeed, a near
monopoly – of most of northern Kordofan, but also access to the grazing
which sprang up to the west and north after the rains.99
The increasing range of movement which this involved raised new chal-
lenges. The household, the stock-owning unit, was only occasionally physi-
cally united, and its members were routinely hundreds of miles apart for long
periods. The perennial problems over labour, ﬁdelity and resource use
within households were magniﬁed by this. So too were the equally perennial
conﬂicts between households, over strayed livestock and accusations of theft.
These new challenges coincided with the growth of Ali el Tom’s power of
patronage; that many sought to meet these challenges by aﬃrming their
status as ‘Sheikh Ali’s people’ and accepting his hukm seems unsurprising. It
is possible that most of those who sought this hukm were household heads.
With the exception of slave cases – mentioned below – the few details which
are recorded suggest that it was men who brought cases, and it is presumably
signiﬁcant that it was Abbadi Ali, not Khadija or her mother, who com-
plained to the nazir.
96 Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 83–7; Asad, The Kababish, 130.
97 Notes, by Margery Perham: Rhodes House, MSS Perham 131, f. 39.
98 For the nineteenth-century transport work, see MacMichael, The Tribes of Northern
and Central Kordofan, 189; for Ali el Tom’s role in this up to 1915, Davies, ‘Policy in Dar
Kababish’, SAD 627/1/1-21; for the camel and sheep trade see notes by Margery
Perham: Rhodes House, MSS Perham 131, f. 123. 99 Nagila, Dhikrayati, 160–7.
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But why, in these circumstances, had no dissatisﬁed women or men pre-
ceded Abbadi Ali in seeking alternative judgement, from the government or
from the qadi? Davies himself had recorded the vivid language of a com-
plainant elsewhere in Kordofan who sought to appeal to a British oﬃcial :
‘The turban will not ease me! The tarbush will not ease me! I want the
helmet! ’.100 The Kababish reluctance to seek the assistance of ‘the helmet’
was not a result of ignorance: however oﬃcials might romanticize the iso-
lation of the nomads, there was actually constant movement from northern
Kordofan to the towns, for the livestock trade required this. And many men
of Ali el Tom’s generation, including the nazir himself, had actually been
brought up in or around Omdurman, under Mahdist rule, were literate and
must have been entirely familiar with the existence of sharia courts.101 So
why did they spurn tarbush and helmet, and accept Ali el Tom’s rulings?
For all Kababish, men and women, Ali el Tom’s hukm had one profound
advantage. British oﬃcials’ idea of ‘honour’ as a sort of birthright of pure
Arabs may have been grossly essentializing, and the implication that a shared
sense of honour would lead to the consensual resolution of all disputes is
clearly unsound. Honour could drive conﬂict along, rather than resolving
it. But for the people of northern Kordofan, their incessant struggles with
one another to control resources – water, grazing and labour – were routinely
perceived as matters of honour. Disputes between men over access to wells,
or over grazing rights, or strayed animals; disputes between men over
women; disputes between men and women over sex and children, or over
household resources and residence – all were matters of honour, for women,
as well as men. It was honourable to assert rights – a woman’s right to be
clothed, or not to have to move endlessly with the animals; a man’s right to
water his stock; a husband’s exclusive rights over his wife’s sexuality. A
sense of honour impugned, or humiliation suﬀered, could and very often did
lead to violence. When attempts were made to regulate the judicial powers of
other nomad nazirs before 1922, a carefully graded list of physical retali-
ations were the most clearly deﬁned ‘oﬀences’ : shetima (‘abuse’), kaﬀ
(‘striking with hand’), sowt (‘striking with whip’), asaia (‘striking with
whip’), ta’an (‘ injury with knife’) and others.102 These gradations revealed a
culture of resource conﬂict, with constant challenges to honour and physical
responses – which might be carefully gauged but might also spin out of
control. There was a profound reluctance to accept the involvement either
of sharia law or of an intrusive state, which would treat as murder the killing
of a man found in another man’s tent, and would regard the vigorous
assertion of a claim to water as a criminal assault. This alien law presented
those who felt that their honour had been challenged with an unpalatable
choice: to act according to the dictates of honour, and face the consequences;
or to obey the law and act dishonourably.
In contrast, Ali el Tom’s hukm oﬀered clear advantages. It might in itself
be innovatory, and it might be exercised in ways which consistently favoured
the Awlad Fadlallah and other Nurab, and extracted additional fees and costs
100 Davies, The Camel’s Back, 86.
101 As Ali el Tom’s teacher noted, with some wonder: Nagila, Dhikrayati, 29.
102 Specimen powers, with Governor Kordofan to CS, 26 May 1920, NRO 1CIVSEC
1/9/30.
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from ordinary Kababish. But it avoided any involvement by the government,
the hakumat ; and it seems clear that oﬃcials were right when they noted that
most Kababish perceived the government law as absolutely alien and hostile,
and shared Ali el Tom’s contempt for ‘the Sudan Penal Code, and its failure
to coincide at most points with Arab law and custom’.103 It was this which
made it easier for Ali el Tom to discourage those who wished to complain
directly to the ADC – a task to which he occasionally applied himself with
some determination, as Lea noted after watching him ‘weed’ a group of
would-be plaintiﬀs: ‘Ali el Tom does not allow unimportant matters to go to
the DC, but sifts the complainants’.104 This desire to exclude the govern-
ment, to keep some aspects of life away from the hakumat, is suggested by the
almost complete absence in written sources – notably Lea’s comprehensive
trek diaries – of any mention of domestic disputes. Occasional cases did come
from Ali el Tom’s hukm to the ADC: murders, which were in theory beyond
Ali el Tom’s powers (though in practice he was allowed to deal with those
occurring within the tribe), and major thefts or aﬀrays.105 But the only
domestic cases which seem to have reached the ADC concerned slaves – and
these were handled in a way which conﬁrmed the utility, for Kababish men,
of accepting Ali el Tom’s creole authority.
Slavery was not recognized in the Condominium, and dealing in slaves was
illegal. But many Kababish owned slaves, and relied on them particularly for
drawing water and for cultivation. The British policy was rigorously to
suppress slave-trading and to give any existing slave who demanded freedom
a document stating that they were free.106 But Kababish continued to obtain a
trickle of slaves, by purchase and kidnap, and Ali el Tom was resolutely
uncooperative in the suppression of this practice (unsurprisingly, since
members of his family – including Ali Salim’s father – were allegedly among
those involved). Those who accepted his hukm thereby gained also a degree
of protection.107 In Dar Kababish British oﬃcials routinely dissuaded slaves
from seeking freedom papers, by pointing out to those who applied that they
would be without any means of subsistence, and by threatening to deport
them from the district.108 Ali el Tom could not hear slave cases – his warrant
forbade this. But he or one of his family was almost always around when
slaves sought freedom papers, or complained of ill-treatment, dispossession
or denial of rights; slaves were routinely fobbed oﬀ by the ADC and denied
any proper hearing. In none of the cases which Lea mentioned in his journal
did slave complainants receive any redress.109 Again, the implication was
clear – Ali el Tom’s hukm might be novel and intrusive, but it oﬀered pro-
tection from an even more alien and intrusive system. For free Kababish, it
103 Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 233; Reid, Inspector Dar Kababish to Governor, 24
Mar. 1918, NRO INTEL 2/46/393; Asad noted that the view of ‘the government’ as alien
was still very clear in the 1960s: ‘Political inequality’, 143.
104 Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 251. 105 Ibid. 38, 80, 230.
106 Lea, ‘Explanatory note’, 15, in Lea, On Trek in Kordofan.
107 Inspector Bara to Governor, 6 Dec. 1913, INTEL 2/46/393; ? to Assistant Director
of Intelligence, 25 Mar. 1914, NRO INTEL 2/35/294; Lea, On Trek in Kordofan, 231;
extract from July 1934 Monthly, in NRO 1CIVSEC 60/7/24. For the allegations against
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was compatible with the basic principles of accumulation and domestic
authority which Asad has emphasized as their key concerns.
But in the case of Abbadi Ali, Ali el Tom revealed his judgement to be a
little too far from Kababish ideas of propriety; the basic principles of
household accumulation, and of men’s and women’s honour, had been
challenged by Ali Salim, and Ali el Tom had refused to act in their defence.
At precisely this point Ali el Tom’s hukm showed how innovative it could be,
and forfeited, for a time, the acquiescence which had allowed its steady
spread. Faced with this kind of innovation Abbadi Ali was willing to turn
instead to the unfamiliar world of theMLC, even though many nomad Arabs
allegedly shared the British suspicion of these alien courts. And he was
willing to go further, and petition the hakumat itself, when this became
necessary: he was not simply a disgruntled troublemaker, as de Bunsen
implied, but neither was his action the tip of an iceberg of suppressed dis-
content. Rather, it represented a moment in the prolonged argument over the
nature and bounds of the power of hukm : with Abbadi Ali turning to an
alternative which had been made less terrifying, and perhaps less alien, by
the encounter with the ‘regularized’ court of Ali el Tom.
CONCLUSION
The Abbadi Ali aﬀair was soon forgotten. Ali el Tom continued to use the
courts to spread his authority, as administrators approvingly noted: ‘A new
branch of the Kababish court was opened at Saﬁa, with the object of
increasing Sh. Ali el Tom’s authority in this area’. Ali el Tom himself bore
the initial costs of establishing this court, so keen had he become on these
institutions.110The erasure of Abbadi Ali’s story (and it was perceived as this,
not as Khadija’s story) was so complete that when Ali el Tom died, in
February 1938, British eulogists recurred, without exception, to the theme of
the nazir as the epitome of all that was best about traditional authority, a man
against whom no complaint had ever been heard: ‘ in 37 years never a
petition’.111 Abbadi Ali had succeeded in establishing that Ali el Tom’s hukm
must respect the claims of matrimony; but not in calling the nazir’s authority
into question, or in encouraging any reform in the practice of his courts.112
Historical analysis of the development of a culture of governance in
Condominium Sudan has tended to concentrate on a perceived long-term
conﬂict between the urban, bureaucratic culture of the eﬀendiyya on the one
hand and the neo-traditional world of the nazirs on the other. But the story of
Khadija and Abbadi Ali suggests that this impression of polarity may mis-
lead, for in Dar Kababish – just as Olufemi Vaughan has recently argued of
roughly contemporaneous processes in Nigeria – colonial subjects were
ﬁnding themselves increasingly subject to a new kind of authority which
rolled multiple forms of power over resources together and delivered them
110 Kordofan Province Monthly Diary, Jan. 1938; and Governor Kordofan to CS,
2 Oct. 1938, NRO 1CIVSEC 1/38/100.
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112 Asad commented on the continuing dominance of the courts by a small clique: The
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into the hands of men whose position relied on the state.113 The power of
these men was located in institutions and practices which served their
ambitions, and provided Kababish house heads with a degree of continuity
and familiarity in resource control, so that Ali el Tom, like the chiefs de-
scribed by Vaughan, could project himself as ‘a custodian of cherished local
values amidst rapid social change’.114 But this custodianship drew the
Kababish ever further into acceptance of a new kind of governance deﬁned
by words extracted from Arabic, yet not quite translated into English, which
hung uncertainly between languages and worlds. Both subjects and rulers
might see in this governance patterns of morality and behaviour which were
familiar; yet its morality was actually uncertain. The institutions and prac-
tices of this governance were not part of the written system of the Sudan
government, nor part of the world of sharia law; nor did they ﬁt into themoral
economy of pastoral nomadism. This governance was not the product of
‘colonial mimesis’ – indeed, it was often driven by precisely contrary forces,
as both colonizer and colonized struggled to maintain distance. Rather,
Kababish acceptance of the intrusive and sometimes extractive operations of
Ali el Tom’s authority rested on its partial compatibility with an established
moral economy of hierarchy and accumulation. Yet this familiarity could be
illusory. On occasion, this creole governance could reveal itself as profoundly
innovative, alien and unfamiliar. Khadija’s story (as we may call it) suggests
how, in practice, the ‘limits of invention’ were constantly being tested.
113 O. Vaughan, ‘Chieftaincy politics and communal identity in western Nigeria,
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